

## Making it through a mid-week wobble

The S&P500 closed just under 0.4% lower over the week, showing composure after a 1.8% fall on Wednesday on market concerns relating to investigations being conducted by the FBI to shed light on possible Russian interference in last year's Presidential election and also whether Mr Trump asked James Comey (now ex-FBI chief) to shelve the Michael Flynn investigation. Such goings-on are seen as diverting the Administration from the important business of rolling out tax reform, infrastructure spending, and reducing red-tape for business. In addition the markets are looking for evidence that first quarter US economic softness is indeed transitory. Given the sense that a few headwinds do exist politically (and economically) for the Administration, market expectations regarding exactly how many rate hikes will be possible for 'normalization' purposes by the Federal Reserve (three for this year had originally been signaled) caused softness in the dollar, and at a time when the dollar index constituents have been buoyant for their own specific reasons. The dollar index closed 2.1% lower over the week (at 97.142), with market participants especially watching the euro as it strengthened to just above \$1.12, the latter helped by perceptions that political risks (particularly nationalist 'tail risks') in the eurozone have fallen. Through all the above, and taking the lead from the US corporate environment, investors have been heartened by recent good results - both at the revenue and net profit levels - which have tended to come in above expectations, and that this overall factor is instrumental in determining stock prices. It has been a long economic cycle in the US, and there is still hope that Trump Administration policies will elongate it further, as well as adding new secular elements to it. **In addition, global investors have increasingly appreciated that although the US of course remains significant as a world economic driver, it is not the only one: growth and confidence in Europe has improved; although the nature of its sectoral contributions is changing, growth in China is still very good; and lastly, even Japanese growth has improved, irrespective of whatever longer-term structural impediments still exist.**

*"Global growth is becoming better balanced"*

In the face of what was mainly risk-off sentiment in the markets last week, the yield on US 10-year Treasuries closed 9 basis points lower, at 2.2346%. The US two-year yield, which is much more policy-sensitive, only fell by two basis points over the week, so on balance the markets still expect a degree of interest rate normalization from the Federal Reserve this year, even if futures markets-based measures now suggest a slightly lower probability that this will continue at next month's FOMC meeting. Coming back to the US 10-year yield, the main point here is probably that the 2.60-2.20% trading range that we have referenced for some time remains intact, thus perpetuating the status quo - in this sense, the overall calmness within trading ranges. Similarly, although the VIX index (indicating the implied volatility in S&P500 index constituents) shot up from 10.40 to 15.50 mid-week, it settled at just above 12.00, a level that is still historically very low. For the year-to-date, Information Technology leads the way (+17.1%), vs. +6.5% for the S&P, following an excellent results season. Over the same period Financials are essentially flat, and Telecoms and Energy are just over 10% lower. The 'higher rate expectation' premium in banking stocks in the US looks to be much reduced. Turning to the STOXX Europe 600 index, this corrected by just over 1% over the week, thus leaving recent profits intact following what looks to be a serious continued international rotation into European equities. Japanese equities were 1.3% lower, with the Topix index 1.3% lower over the week, also reflecting a higher yen (now at 111.26). China's CSI 300 equity index was 0.5% firmer, bouncing off its basically flat long-term moving average, and after a 5% correction from a recent high in mid-April; the authorities there are continuing to remove speculative fervor from various asset classes, and walking a fine line as they try to avoid a further blow-up in the shadow banking sector. Meanwhile, in Brazil, the indictment of President Michel Temer led to a 12% fall in



Claude-Henri Chavanon

Head of Products & Services  
 Wealth & Private Banking

equity values over the week (and 15% from the high early in the week); this is especially disappointing as there were high hopes that Mr Temer would turn the country around, based on his business-friendly policies, plus the fact this comes so soon after the 'Carwash' scandal. In oil markets, the price of WTI rallied by just over 5% (to \$50.33), after (a) early in the week KSA and Russia indicated their support for extending output restraint until March next year, (b) US data showing inventories falling for the sixth week in a row, (c) US oil production fell for the first time in 13 weeks, and (d) market talk suggesting output restraint could be extended to oil products in an effort to accelerate rebalancing. **Lastly, gold rallied by 2.2% over the week, to \$1,255.93, not managing to overcome offerings that prevented the approximate \$1,264/oz overhead resistance being taken-out, prior to the next resistance likely just above \$1,290.**

*"The events unfolding in Brazil are very disappointing, especially after Rousseff last year"*

As mentioned in our opening paragraphs, the events of last week in Brazil seem to have come as a genuine shock, completely

**out of left field - even in Brazil.** So much had been hoped for, following President Michel Temer being appointed as successor to the disgraced former president, Dilma Rousseff. As is to be expected, the nature of the allegations is complicated. As far as we understand, the two Batista brothers who own JBS SA, conducted an illegal transaction involving JBS, the Batista's family holding company, and state-owned banks and pension funds. The O Globo newspaper reported that Mr Temer was complicit in an attempt to pay a potential witness to remain silent (Eduardo Cunha, the former leader of the lower house of Brazil's Congress, jailed following his involvement in the so-called 'Carwash' scandal a few years ago). The Batistas have reportedly arrived at a plea-bargain, in which they have apparently provided many hours of video testimony detailing how they bribed many public and pension fund officials. Temer has been dragged in as the result of the deal reached between the Batistas and prosecutors. JBS and its owners have been huge donors in political campaigns in recent years, and it sounds like a very wide web of people is involved. JBS are said to have paid bribes to inspectors to facilitate the sale of contaminated meat. Coming back to Mr Temer, he apparently told one of the Batista brothers that he would have to keep up the payments to Cunha - and this was secretly recorded, and handed over to prosecutors. Although more and better information will surely surface, this series of events are a great shame, especially as the local Ibovespa equity index and the real currency were excellent performers last year. All this has led to calls that Temer, who has been president for just a year, must resign. He has denied any involvement, it must be said. **As Goldman Sachs has said, all this comes at a challenging time for the policy agenda, and the reformists' ability to enact fiscal reforms and to make other progress will likely have been weakened.**

*“The IMF is positive on the economic outlook for the UAE, and what has been achieved here”*

Non-oil GDP growth in the UAE is expected to recover this year, and after domestic economic adjustments made since oil prices fell, according to the IMF at the beginning of

**last week.** They expect non-oil growth to grow by about 3.3% in 2017, from 2.7% last year. Including oil, they expect GDP growth to slow to 1.3%, vs. 3% last year, as the UAE reduces oil output in line with last November's OPEC/NOPEC agreement on oil production restraint. The IMF expects an improvement in global trade this year to help the UAE (which has a relatively open economy). Reuters reported that the governments of the seven emirates collectively tightened fiscal policy by about 9% of GDP in 2015, followed by a further 5% in 2016, with the implication that there could now be more flexibility, and/or that much of any necessary adjustment had been made. Infrastructure spending for the country as a whole is set to grow more slowly in the years to come, and the introduction of VAT next year will help fiscal balances. The IMF expects the UAE to eliminate its fiscal deficit by about 2022. It was encouraging to also hear that they expected substantial infrastructure spending by Dubai for Expo 2020 would be unlikely to adversely affect the emirate's finances. Dubai government (plus government-related enterprise) debt fell to 112% of GDP last year, from 126% in 2015. As expected, there will be a small fiscal deficit (it should fall to 4.5% of GDP this year) in the immediate years to follow, pre-the Expo. When we last did the back-of-the-envelope calculation, the oil and gas sector was thought to be about 24% of direct UAE GDP. **We continue to be bullish about the outlook for the UAE economy, especially from next year onwards; the economy is becoming more diversified than previously, with the possibility that non-hydrocarbon GDP growth could quite easily be in the region of 3-4% on average over the next five years.**

*“Let's not forget that markets need to correct from time to time – and US equities have not done so”*

**INVESTMENT SUMMARY:** The Asset Allocation Committee met last week, and had a lengthy discussion about the likelihood that the well-known political headwinds facing President Trump and his Administration (and the potential knock-on effects mentioned earlier) might finally provoke a worthwhile correction in US equities. When we published the Global

Investment Outlook in January we said we expected at least a 5% correction, although as our readers will know, this didn't occur. The Conservative, Balanced, and Growth asset allocation model portfolios we use are overweight in US equities, within a risk-on macro framework. While we never like to 'tinker' with positions, the Committee exists to take worthwhile tactical decisions across asset classes. The members wanted to see whether the markets might bounce at the end of what had been a volatile and testing week, and to be as sure as it could be that the 8-10% downside required (to make it worthwhile to sell, and then buy back) was of a sufficiently high probability. The equity markets did indeed bounce on Friday, and the discussion continues. Although a decision was deferred, we nonetheless hope you find it interesting from a practical investment standpoint. The other overall point was that such a decision is a frictional and inter-related one, in that it begs questions about the fixed income, currency hedge (we have euro exposure hedged), and other aspects of the macro investment picture in our investment grids. We will follow-up. **In the meantime, investment strategy remains unchanged.**

*For any inquiries related to this article, please contact [Alain.Marckus@nbad.com](mailto:Alain.Marckus@nbad.com) or [Clint.Dove@nbad.com](mailto:Clint.Dove@nbad.com)*

### **Disclaimer:**

This report has been prepared and issued by the Global Asset Management (“GAM”) of the National Bank of Abu Dhabi PJSC (“NBAD”) outlining particular services provided by GAM and does not constitute or form part of any offer or invitation to sell, or any solicitation of any offer to purchase or subscribe for, any shares in NBAD or otherwise or a recommendation for a particular person to enter into any transaction or to adopt any strategy nor shall it or any part of it form the basis of or be relied on in connection with any contract therefore. This report was prepared exclusively for the benefit and internal use of NBAD. This report is incomplete without reference to, and should be viewed solely in conjunction with the associated oral briefing provided by GAM. The report is proprietary to GAM and may not be disclosed to any third party or used for any other purpose without the prior written consent of GAM. The information in this report reflects prevailing conditions and our views as of this date, which are accordingly subject to change. In preparing this report, we have relied upon and assumed, without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all the information available from public sources or which was otherwise reviewed by us. In addition, our analysis are not and do not purport to be appraisals of the assets, stock or business of the recipient. Even when this presentation contains a kind of appraisal, it should be considered preliminary, suitable only for the purpose described herein and not be disclosed or otherwise used without the prior written consent of GAM. NBAD clients may already hold positions in the assets subject to this report and may accordingly benefit from the buying or selling of such assets as referred to in this report. This document does not purport to set out any advice, recommendation or representation on the suitability of any investment, transaction or product (as referred to in this document or otherwise), for potential purchasers. Potential purchasers should determine for themselves the relevance of the information contained in this document and the decision to purchase any investment contained herein should be based on such investigation and analysis as they themselves deem necessary. Before entering into any transaction potential purchasers should ensure that they fully understand the potential risks and rewards of that transaction (including, without limitation, all financial, legal, regulatory, tax and accounting consequences of entering into the transaction and an understanding as to how the transaction will perform under changing conditions) and that they independently determine that the transaction is appropriate for them given their objectives, experience, financial and operational resources and other relevant circumstances. Potential purchasers should consider consulting with such advisers and experts as they deem necessary to assist them in making these determinations and should not rely on NBAD for such purposes. NBAD is acting solely in the capacity of a potential arm’s-length contractual counterparty and not as a financial adviser or fiduciary in any transaction unless we have otherwise expressly agreed so to act in writing. NBAD does not provide any accounting, tax, regulatory or legal advice. NBAD is licensed by the Central Bank of the UAE.

### **London**

NBAD London Branch is Authorized by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from NBAD London branch on request. Registered in England & Wales: Company No: FC009142; VAT No: GB245 3301 91.

### **Paris**

NBAD Paris Branch is licensed by the French Prudential Control Authority as a credit institution. NBAD Paris is registered in France under the company number: RCS Paris B 314 939 547.

### **Switzerland**

This publication is for your information only and is not intended as an offer, or a solicitation of an offer, to buy or sell any investment or other specific product. Certain services and products are subject to legal restrictions and cannot be offered worldwide on an unrestricted basis and/or may not be eligible for sale to all investors. All information and opinions expressed in this document were obtained from sources believed to be reliable and in good faith, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to its accuracy or completeness. All information and opinions as well as any prices indicated are currently as of the date of this report, and are subject to change without notice. The analysis contained herein is based on numerous assumptions. Different assumptions could result in materially different results. At any time the National Bank of Abu Dhabi PJSC and/or NBAD Private Bank (Suisse) SA may have a long or short position, or deal as principal or agent, in relevant securities or provide advisory or other services to the issuer of relevant securities or to a company connected with an issuer. Some investments may not be readily realizable since the market in the securities is illiquid and therefore valuing the investment and identifying the risk to which you are exposed may be difficult to quantify. Futures and options trading is considered risky. Past performance of an investment is no guarantee for its future performance. Some investments may be subject to sudden and large falls in value and on realization you may receive back less than you invested or may be required to pay more. Changes in foreign exchange rates may have an adverse effect on the price, value or income of an investment. National Bank of Abu Dhabi PJSC expressly prohibits the distribution and transfer of this document to third parties for any reason. National Bank of Abu Dhabi PJSC and/or NBAD Private Bank (Suisse) SA will not be liable for any claims or lawsuits from any third parties arising from the use or distribution of this document. This report is for distribution only under such circumstances as may be permitted by applicable law. The “Directives on the Independence of Financial Research”, issued by the Board of Directors of the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) do not apply.